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SUMMARY: The CA DC held that the government acted ar-
b . · 1 d · · 1 · · d' h JI · · \\ itrari y an capricious yin rescin ing t e passive restraint 
(airbass and autofilatic seatbelts) automobile safety standard. - ' 
680 F.2d 206 (CA DC 1982). These curve-lined petitions for 
cert followed. 
FACTS AND HOLDING BELOW: In 1966, Congress passed the 
'---, 
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 
1381 et seq. (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). This Act directs the 
Secretary of Transportation to issue automobile safety stan-
dards that "shall be practicable, shall meet the need for mo-
tor vehicle safety, and shall be stated in objective terms." 
15 u.s.c. § 1392 (a). The Act says nothing specifically about --
pa~ai✓. 
In 1967, DOT issued a regulation (Standard 208) requir-
ing manual seatbelts in all cars. Most people refused to use 
their seatbelts, however, and their installation did not re-
duce significantly the number of traffic injuries. Consequent-
ly, the consumer lobby and the insurance industry set out to 
convince DOT of the necessity for some type of passive re-
straint, one that would require no cooperation on the part of 
the citizenry. 
- -- 3 -
✓ 
In 1970, DOT modified ~ ar <i, 2i_! to include passive 
protection requirements. In 1972, it issued a final version 
of Standard 208, which required installation of passive re-
straints or manual belts coupled with ignition interlocks in 
all passenger cars built between 1973 and 1975, and required 
passive restraints in all cars after 1975. This rule was 
struck down as to passive restraints in Chrysler Corp. v. 
Dep't of Transportation, 472 F.2d 659 (CA 6 1972). 
y 
In 1974, Congress amended the Act to bar federal safety 
standards requiring any kind of ignition interlock (which pre-
vent the car from starting unless the front seat belts are 
fastened) or continuous buzzer to warn that seatbelts were 
unfastened. The agency then omitted the ignition interlock 
and buzzer requirements. 
In ~ 976, the Republican Secretary of Transportation, 
William ~ uspended the passive restraint requirement 
altogether. Four months later, Coleman's Democratic succes-
sor, Brock Adams, reopened rulemaking on passive restraints. 
In 1977, @ issued a new mandatory passive restraint regu-
lation, known as Modified Standard 208. 42 Fed.Reg. 34,289 
(July 5, 1977). The EYadministration's decision to re- l 
scind Modified Standard 208 prompted the instant litigation. 
Modified Standard 208 required manufacturers to install --------
passive restraints on all large cars by 1982, and on all cars 
by 1984. Two types of passive restraints satisfied the stan-
dard: airbags and a\J,tomatic seatbelts. In 1977, the agency 
expected that most manufacturers would install airbags. 
- -- 4 -
In February 1981, Adams's successor, Andrew Lewis, re-
opened rulemaking on passive restraints and proposed rescis-
sion of Modified Standard 208. After receiving comments and 
holding hearings, the agency amended Modified Standard 208 to 
rescind the passive restraint requirement. 49 C.F.R. Part 571, 
46 Fed.Reg. 53,419 (October 29, 1981} (Notice 25}. 
b . f tµ.-h / '1 ff ( . d h . . In rie , t e agency rescinde t e passive restraint ,.,_ 
requirement because design changes in the type of restraint 
that most manufacturers were planning to use made it impossi-
ble for the agency to predict that enough people would use the 
' restraints to justify the addtional costs of $1 billion/year. ,. 
Specifically, the manufacturers had decided to use de-
tachable automatic belts rather than either air bags or con-
tinuous belts. --Detachable belts have a buckle so they can be 
released in an emergency. Continuous · belts are designed to 
spool out so the occupant can get out of the car in an emer-
gency. The manufacturers abandoned air bags because they were { 
too expensive, and chose detachable over continuous belts be-
~lah,r. 
cause of concern over public acceptance of~-
Although all the evidence indicated that usage rates on 
continuous automatic belts were very high, there was no evi-
dence at all on useage rates for detachable automatic belts. 
The agency declined to extrapolate from the data for non-
• detachabl~elts, noting that "[o]nce a detachable automatic 
belt is detached, it becomes identical to a manual belt. Con-
trary to assertions of some supporters of the standard, its 
use thereafter requires the same type of affirmative action 
- -
- 5 -
that is the stumbling block to obtaining high usage levels of 
manual belts." Ptn. App. 98a. The agency explained why the 
data on usage rates for the automatic belts in VW Rabbits and 
Chevrolet Chevettes was inapposite (primarily because they 
were functionally non-detachable), and concluded that "the 
change in car manufacturers' plans has left the agency without 
any factual basis for reliably predicting the likely usage 
increases due to detachable automatic belts, or for even pre-
dicting the likelihood of any increase at all." Id. at 99a. 
The agency then considered and rejected the possibility 
of amending the standard to require a use-inducing feature. 
It noted that it lacked authority to require ignition inter-
locks, and stated that continous, non-detachable belts were 
undesireable because of the "widespread, latent and irrational 
fear by many members of the public that they could be trapped 
by the seat belt after a crash." Id. at 110a. The agency did 
not consider requiring airbags. 1 
✓ 
Finally, the agency concluded that it was unreasonable 
.....___ ' -
to impose the $1 billion/year cost of passive restraints 
--- --....,,,---=- - - ------------- ,,,,.._,, - -
the public in view of the uncertainty over the increase, ----
on 
if 
1some of the public comment had claimed that the Act is a 
"technology-forcing" statute mandating the best protection 
technologically available. In response, the agency stated: 
"[T]he issue of automatic restraints now before the agency is not 
a 'technology-forcing' issue. The manual seat belt available in 
every car sold today offers the same, or more, protection than 
either the automatic seat belt or the air bag. Instead, the 
agency today faces a decision to force people to accept 




any, in usage expected from such restraints. It therefore 
rescinded t✓ passive restraint requirement. 
The CA DC granted the petition for review, holding that 
the decision to rescind the passive restraint requirement was 
arbitrary and capricious. 
The§~ it faced was the proper scope of review ~ 
of a decision to rescind a rule that had not yet gone into 
effect, as opposed to a decision not to promulgate a rule. It 
termed this a question of "first impression." 680 F.2d at 
218. It rejected the agency claim that a decision to rescind 
deserves the same deference as an agency's choice not to act, 
and held that rescission is subject to the same scope of re-
view as the promulgation of a rule. Id. at 228. 
After reviewing Congress's acts and non-acts with re-
spect to passive restraints over the prior decade, the CA 
stated: ____,. 
[The agency] is not writing on a clean slate; it can-
not suggest that the congressional actions and fail-
ures to act described above have no bearing on the 
C/-Jt9e, 
-~ 
agency's freedom to regulate on this question. It ~ 
follows that [the ~y] has tt;.e burden of explaining ~ ~-
why it has changed course, ana of showing tnatAescis- -~~ 
sion of Modifiea Standard 208 was reasonable. ~ 
Id. at 229 (footnote omitted). The CA clarified that it would 
uphold the rescission if the agency "clearly articulates a 
reasonable basis for that action." Id. "We must ascertain 
the facts 'on which [the agency] relied, determine whether 
those facts have some basis in the record, and judge whether a 
reasonable decisionmaker could respond to those facts as the 
agency did." Id. at 230. 
• 
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The CA then held that the recission was arbitrary and 
capricious for two reasons. First, in light of (1) the evi-
dence that automatic belts now on the road are effective, (2) 
the low marginal cost of automatic seatbelts versus the high 
benefits in deaths and injuries avoided, and (3) Congressional 
acquiesence in the agency's prior rulings and findings, it was 
irrational and arbitrary for the agency not even to seek evi-
dence to determine whether detachable belts would be ef fec-
tive. "[The agency] has some burden, in other words, to show 
that a regulation once considered to prevent deaths and inju-
ries efficiently can no longer be expected to do so." Id. at 
231. However, the agency has offered "not one iota of evi-
dence to support [its] conclusion that Modified Standard 208 
as written will fail to increase nationwide seatbelt use by 13 
percentage points or more." Id. 
Second, the majority held it was irrational and arbi-
trary for the agency not to consider the obvious alternatives-
-air bags and non-detachable seat belts. The CA dismissed the 
agency's treatment of non-detachable seat belts as summary. 
"By artificially narrowing the options available--or ignoring 
those options completely--the agency acted in a totally arbi-
trary fashion." Id. at 233. Judge Edwards did not join this 
part of the court's opinion. 
✓ 
The CA then remanded to the agency. Two months later, 
on August 4, 1982, the CA issuelan order and memorandum sua 
sponte staying the compliance dates of Modified Standard 208 
from September 1, 1982, until September 1, 1983. 
- -- 8 -
CONTENTIONS: Petrs contend: (1) the CA erred in apply-
ing a different standard to a descision to rescind a rule than 
it would have to a decision not to promulgate that same rule; 
(2) the CA erred in finding a "congressional mandate" in post-
enactment legislative history; (3) the CA erred in invalidat-
ing the agency's rescission of a prospective rule because the 
agency failed to consider regulatory alternatives that were 
neither raised by the agency's notice of proposed rulemaking 
nor foreclosed by the agency's rescission order; (4) the CA 
exceeded the proper limits of judicial review in ordering the 
passive restraint requirement into effect on September 1, 
1983; and (5) the CA erred in finding the agency's action to 
be arbitrary and capricious. 
Resps contend: (1) this case presents the application 
of well-settled principles of law to unique facts; and (2) the 
decision below was correctly decided. 
DISCUSSION: I recommend a GRANT for three reasons. 
<!Sz;;2 the case presents a ~ vel question of law on which the 
Court's guidance would be helpful to the lower courts: What is 
the appropriate scope of review of a decision to rescind a 
regulation that has not yet gone into effect? ~ , the CA 
DC seems to have exceeded its powers in requiring the agency 
to consider alternatives to the automatic seatbelts that the 
manufacturers were planning to use. c§', a grant seems ap-
propriate in light of magnitude of the money involved ($1 bil-
lion/year costs versus alleged savings of $4 billion), the 
impact on a key sector of the nation's economy, the damage the 
- -
- 9 -
decision below has done to the administration's deregulation 
policy, and the likelihood that the CA DC was wrong. 
However, there is no merit to the claim that the CA 
erred in setting a compliance date for implementation of Modi-
fied Standard 208. By striking down the rescission order, the 
CA restored the status quo ante. It then exercised its powers 
as a court of equity to delay by one year the implementation 
dates in Modified Standard 208. 
In conclusion, the Court should GRANT all three peti-
tions for cert, but should limit the grant to exclude Question 
5 in No. 82-354 and Question 3 in No. 82-398 (the implementa-
tion date questions). 
There are responses in each case and a reply in 
No. 82-354. 
October 23, 1982 Levene Opn in petn 
... - - -
C-, 
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Nos. 82-354, 82-355, 82-398: 
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 
From: Mark April 24, 1983 
Questions Presented 
1. Whether the National Highway Traffic Safety Administra-
tion acted un lawfully in rescinding a rule requiring that all 
~ 
motor vehicles carry passive restraints such as airbags or pas-
sive seatbelts. ~ . 
2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred by reinstating the 
rule and establishing a date for its effectiveness, rather than /~ 
~f-'--- ~ -
simply remanding to the agency for further proceedings. 
~ 
• 
- - 2. 
I. 
There are two major quest ions here: (i) what standard of 
review applies when an agency rescinds a previously adopted rule, 
"(" -
and ( ii) whether the agency in this case met that standard. I 
disagree with both CADC's standard and its conclusion. I there-
fore recommend reversal. J ~ ( 
A 
A brief chronology of key events may be useful in analyzing ,V~ 
~ 
this case: 
1966 -- National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act is 




DOT issues Standard 208, mandating safety belts in 
1969-1972 DOT conducts rulemaking concerning passive re-
straint systems. 
1972 -- DOT issues Modified Standard 208, requiring "com-
plete passive protection" on all vehicles issued after August 
1975: in interim, vehicles must have lap and shoulder belts plus 
ignition interlocks. CA6 upheld the decision to require passive 
restraints, but suspended the rule because DOT had made testing 
errors in setting performance specifications. Chrysler Corp. v. 
DOT, 472 F.2d 659 (1972). 
197 4 -- Congress enacts the Motor Vehicle and School bus 
Safety Amendments, banning an~ federal standard requiring ~ ni--
tion interlocks or continuous buzzers that warn that seatbelts 
~ 
- - 3. 
are not in use. Also, it provided that any future amendment to 
Standard 208 would be subject to congressional veto. 
1974 -- DOT proposed a new standard requiring "detachable" 
passive restraints -- restraints with a simple pushbutton re-
lease. 
1976 -- Secretary ~ man suspended the passive restraint -
standard, initiated a new rulemaking, and finally concluded that 
no mandatory rule __§hould be promulg ated. ----~ ~ '-~-
1977 -- Four months later, new Secretary Adams issued new 
passive restraint regulat'on, requiring either airbags or detach-
able passive restraints. This rule was _:1pheld by CA.E_C in Pacific 
-.._... 




Congressional veto resolutions were proposed but not 
The standard was to become mandatory between 198 2 and 
1979-1980 Appropriations riders passed in both years pro-..___---~~ ~ -- - ' -
hibited funds for DOT implementation of the standard. 
_____... ,_ L L \. l 
1981 -- New Secretary Lewis reopended the rulemaking, or-
dered a one-year delay in implementation, and then amended the 
standard to eliminate the passive restraint requirement. 
B 
Judge Mikva' s opinion for CADC can be described only as re- LA/~ I 
~ ·r- -
markab1e. (This may be seen by the fact that resps largely ab-
-" 
jure reliance on the legal analysis used by CADC.) The opinion 
contains three key errors. 
1. First, CADC came up with the idea of determining the 
- - 4. 
standard of review after reviewing the legislative history and 
determining "congressional intent": 
"In determining the scrutiny with which the 
arbitrary and capr1c1ous standard should be 
applied to NHTSA's rescission of Modified 
Standard 208 • • • we must first consider the 
extent to which NHTSA' s action may be incon-
sistent with the congressional purpose behind 
the Safety Act. It may seem unusual to dis- / 
cuss this legislative history before a precise 
standard of judicial review has been formulat-
ed, but in this case there is no better way to 
undertake such a task." Pet. App. 32a. 
I 
CADC then reviewed the entire series of congressional events be-
tween 1974 and 1981 and concluded that it suggests "a congressio-
nal commitment to the concept of automobile crash protection de-
vices for vehicle occupants that we may not take lightly," id., 
at 46a, and that "each time Congress reviewed the passive re-
straint standard it was essentially confirmed," id., at 47a. Be-
cause of this allegedly clear evidence of congressiopal ..._intent, 
/lM..f./'"U.,L,v-'9-(~~~I 
CADC found that the standard of Ieview must be thorough, search-/\ ~ ... . 
ing, careful, etc. - ~ 
The remarkable thing about the legislative history reviewed 
- ·- -
by CADC is that not ress oc-
curred during that erio, 
" - ---forbidding DOT to implement the rule. Judge Mikva relied on such 
things as Congress' failure to veto the rule, favorable reports 
on the rule from certain committees or subcommittees, statements 
of support from individual congressmen, etc. My reading of those 
legislative battles suggests that CADC is quite wrong in finding 
any clear support for Standard 208 as issued in 1977. More im-
portant, I think this case is totally inappropriate for applica-
• 
- - 5 • 
tion of a theory of legislative ratification. The passive re-
straint rule never has been in effect, and the congressional ma-
terial cited by CADC consists solely of internal debates that 
never produced any legislative action at all. 
2. CADC noted that NHTSA rescinded the passive restraint 
rule on a 3-part analysis: (i) automakers would comply by using 
detachable passive restraints, (ii) once detached, a detachable 
restraint is just like a manual belt, and (iii) it cannot reli-
ably be predicted that any increase in seat belt usage resulting 
from the passive feature will be sufficient to justify the addi-
tional costs. CADC agreed on the first two points, but not on 
the third. 
The interesting feature of the DC' s disagreement is that 
CADC expressly did not disagree with NHTSA's view that there was 
"substantial uncertainty" about the usage rates with detachable 
belts. Instead, . CADC held that this finding was not sufficient: - ' 
"[T] he question is not whether evidence shows that usage rates 
will increase by the necessary amount, but whether there is evi-
dence showing they will not." Id., at 51a. In other words, once 
a regulation has been passed on the basis of certain assumptions, 
an agency is forbidden to rescind that regulation unless it can 
prove that those assumptions are false. The fact that an agency 
subsequently determines that there is "substantial uncertainty" 
about the validity of those assumptions is not sufficient to jus-
tify suspension of that regulation. 
I do not think any elaborate analysis is needed to demon-
strate that this sta~ s wrong. , - -=-- If an agency decides to act '~ 
- e:.~u--/~ ~ Vk.,)~ 6. 
on assumption X, but later finds that Xis 
- -""--T 
qu~t:::::f.e~ --------------- "' well within the agency's broad discretion to decide not to go 
- --- - -
ahead with the action. The point is that an agency has 
discretion in deciding whether to adopt or rescind informal 
rules, and that means that the burden of proof falls not on the 
agency, but on those challenging the agency's action. 
,....___.,. ----- ~ ~ -
3. An alternative reason given by Judge Mikva -- in a por-
tion of the opinion that Judge Edwards refused to join -- was 
that the agency erred by failing to consider amending Standard 
208 to eliminate the detachable feature that made the required 
passive restraints similar to manual belts. In other words, the 
agency should have considered requiring either airbags or nonde-
tachable passive restraints. "By artificially narrowing the op-
tions available -- or ignoring those options completely -- the 
agency acted in a totally arbitrary fashion." Id., at 56a. 
There is no question that it would have been permissible for 
the agency to have considered these alternatives to rescinding 
the rule. Indeed, one would hope that an agency would consider 
all options. But the failure to do so cannot be a basis of re-
versa!. The ef feet of Judge Mikva' s analysis is to say that 
NHTSA acted arbitrarily because instead of rescinding the exist-
ing rule -- a rule NHTSA believes is unjustifiable -- it should 
have adopted a different and more stringent rule. This is tanta-
mount to requiring the agency to promulgate a certain rule. I do 
not think a court may tell an administrative agency that it 
abused its discretion in not adopting a particular substantive 
rule that the court believes would be preferable to rescission of 
- - 7. 
an existing rule. 
C 
As outlined above, I think CADC's analysis is wrong. 
view, the standard for rescinding a rule is no more stringent -- ~~-~ - ~ 
than the general "arbitrary and capricious" standard that applies ----- - -~ ~ to adoption of a rule. Under this general test, I think the ac-
tion of NHTSA should be upheld. So long as the agency was cor-
rect in finding that there is substantial uncertainty about belt 
usage with detachable passive restraints, I would hold that the 
agency may choose to suspend or eliminate the requirement. (Note 
that CADC made no finding on the accuracy of this "substantial 
uncertainty" finding. Thus, this Court could remand to CADC on 
tr' 
that question, though I suspect the Court will prefer to resolve vJ..u J 
this case once and for all.) 
---------
----9~ 
I should point out that I am not much impressed with the 
reasonableness of the agency's action in this case. The evidence 
strongly suggests that a "true" passive restraint requirement 
(i.e., airbags and/or nondetachable restraints) would save thou-
sands of lives and would be cost-effective. The evidence also 
suggests that some nondetachable restraints do provide sufficient 
opportunity for emergency egress. The agency's primary reason 
for not going to such a standard is possible public host il ity. 
While I do not discount this possibility, I am not sure it should 
overcome the otherwise strong evidence of the need for a regula-
tion. Like the Reagan administration, I believe there is a lot 
of unnecessary and counterproductive federal regulation; unlike 
the Reagan administration, I believe there are cases where feder-
- - 8. 
al regulation is fully justified. {)f 
~ , 
In short, I am under no illusion as to what is happening 
here: this was primarily a political decision by the new admin-
istration to delete a rule that it believed was unnecessary and 
in fact harmful to the auto industry. If this decision had elim-
inated a longstanding agency regulation, I might recommend a dif-
ferent outcome. But it must be remembered that the rule rescind-
, ------ ---, .., - --
ea was adopted at the very beginning of the new Carter adminis-
tration, despite a final rulemaking determination four months ___, 
earlier by Secretary Coleman (Ford administration) that such a 
rule should not be promulgated. And that Carter administration 
rule was upheld by CADC under a deferential analysis. Given that 
the rule never took effect, and given that its proposed content 
has shifted with the political winds, I do not think NHTSA's ac-
tion was unlawful. Such discontinuous agency decisionmaking is 
not to be encouraged. But Congress has been unwilling or unable 
to act decisively in instructing the agency as to what type of _____ ,__________.... - -
ru~ . (I would note that this is a case where the con-
gressional veto provision was used as a substitute for congres-
sional decisionmaking; in v(g'74 the House voted overwhelmingly to 
forbid i!!!Y. passive restraint rule, but the conference, to avoid 
deciding this issue, inserted a veto provision instead.) 
II 
As you have indicated that you believe the agency did not 
act arbitrarily and capriciously, you need not reach the question 
whether CADC acted improperly in instructing the agency to imple-
- - 9. 
ment the rule as of September 1, 1983. In my view, if CADC was 
correct in its decision on the merits, it did not abuse its dis-
cretion in entering this order. The effect of CADC's decision 
was to leave the rule in effect, and that means the agency must 
comply with it. All CADC did was give what it thought was area-
sonable period of time for the agency to do so. 
III 
CADC should be reversed, and the decision of the agency 
should be upheld. 
~ - -
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TION, ET AL., PETITIONERS 
82-398 V. 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE n \ sURANCE 
COMP ANY ET AL. 
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[June-, 1983] 
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The development of the automobile gave America 
precedented freedom to travel, but exacted a high pric 
enhanced mobility. Since 1929, motor vehicles have 
the leading cause of accidental deaths and injuries 
United States. In 1982, 46,300 Americans died in m 
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and injured. 1 While a consensus exists that the current loss 
of life on our highways is unacceptably high, improving 
safety does not admit to easy solution. In 1966, Congress 
decided that at least part of the answer lies in improving the 
design and safety features of the vehicle itself. 2 But much 
of the technology for building safer cars was undeveloped or 
untested. Before changes in automobile design could be 
mandated, the effectiveness of these changes had to be stud-
ied, their costs examined, and public acceptance considered. 
This task called for considerable expertise and Congress re-
sponded by enacting the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle 
Safety Act of 1966, (Act), 15 U. S. C. §§ 1381 et seq. (1976 & 
Supp. IV 1980). The Act, created for the purpose of "reduc-
[ing] traffic accidents and deaths and injuries to persons re-
sulting from traffic accidents," 15 U. S. C. 1381, directs the 
Secretary of Transportation or his delegate to issue motor 
vehicle safety standards that "shall be practicable, shall meet 
the need for motor vehicle safety, and shall be stated in ob-
jective terms." 15 U. S. C. § 1392(a). In issuing these 
standards, the Secretary is directed to consider "relevant 
available motor vehicle safety data," whether the proposed 
standard "is reasonable, practicable and appropriate" for the 
particular type of motor vehicle ~nd the "extent to which 
such standards will contribute to carrying out the purposes" 
of the Safety Act. 15 U. S. C. § 1392(f) (1), (3), (4) . 3 
1 NHTSA Traffic Safety Report, (April 1983). 
2 The Senate Committee on Commerce Reported: 
"The promotion of motor vehicle safety through voluntary standards has 
largely failed. The unconditional imposition of mandatory standards at the 
earliest practicable date is the only course commensurate with the highway 
death and injury toll." S. Rep. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) 4. 
3 The Secretary's general authority to promulgate safety standards 
under the Act has been delegated to the Administrator of the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). 49 CFR § l.51(a) 
(1979) This opinion will use the terms NHTSA and agency interchange-
ably when referring to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administra-
tion, the Department of Transportation, and the Secretary of 
... - -
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The Act also authorizes judicial review, under the provi-
sions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 US.C. 
§ 706 (1976), of all "orders establishing, amending, or revok-
ing a Federal motor vehicle safety standard," 15 U. S. C. 
§ 1392(b). Under this authority, we review today whether 
the NHTSA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in revoking the 
requirement in Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208 that new 
motor vehicles produced after September 1982 be equipped 
with passive restraints to protect the safety of the occupants 
of the vehicle in the event of a collision. Briefly summa-
rized, we hold that the agency failed to present an adequate 
basis and explanation for rescinding the passive restraint re-
quirement and that the agency must either consider the mat-
ter further or adhere to or amend Standard 208 along lines 
which its analysis supports. 
I 
The regulation whose rescission is at issue bears a complex 
and convoluted history. Over the course of approximately 
60 rulemaking notices, the requirement has been imposed, 
amended, rescinded, reimposed, and now rescinded again. 
As originally issued by the Department of Transportation 
in 1967, Standard 208 simply required the installation of 
seatbelts in all automobiles. 32 Fed. Reg. 2408, 2415 (Feb. 
3, 1967). It soon became apparent that the level of seatbelt 
use was too low to reduce traffic injuries to an acceptable 
level. The Department therefore began consideration of 
"passive occupant restraint systems"-devices that do not 
depend for their effectiveness upon any action taken by the 
occupant except that necessary to operate the vehicle. 34 
Fed. Reg. 11,148 (July 2, 1969). Two types of automatic crash 
protection emerged: automatic seatbelts and airbags. The 
automatic seatbelt is a traditional safety belt, which when 
fastened to the interior of the door remains attached without 
impeding entry or exit from the vehicle, and deploys auto-
Transportation. 
- -
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matically without any action on the part of the passenger. 
The airbag is an inflatable device concealed in the dashboard 
and steering column. It automatically inflates when a sensor 
indicates that deceleration forces from an accident have ex-
ceeded a preset minimum, then rapidly deflates to dissipate 
those forces. After substantial on-the-road experience with 
both devices, it was estimated by NHTSA that passive re-
straints could prevent approximately 12,000 deaths and over 
100,000 serious injuries annually. 42 Fed. Reg. at 34,298. 
In 1969, the Department formally proposed a standard 
requiring the installation of passive restraints, 34 Fed. Reg. 
11,148 (July 2, 1969), thereby commencing a lengthy series of 
proceedings. In 1970, the agency revised Standard 208 to 
include passive protection requirements, 35 Fed. Reg. 16, 
927 (Nov. 3, 1970), and in 1972, the agency amended the 
standard to require full passive protection for all front seat 
occupants of vehicles manufactured after August 15, 1975. 37 
Fed. Reg. 3911 (Feb. 24, 1972). In the interim, vehicles 
built between August 1973 and August 1975 were to carry ei-
ther passive restraints or lap and shoulder belts coupled with 
an "ignition interlock" that would prevent starting the vehi-
cle if the belts were not connected. 4 On review, the agen-
cy's decision to require passive restraints was found to be 
supported by "substantial evidence" and upheld. Chrysler 
Corp. v. Dep't of Transportation, 472 F. 2d 659 (CA 6 1972).5 
In preparing for the upcoming model year, most car mark-
4 Early in the process, it was assumed that passive occupant protection 
meant the installation of inflatable airbag restraint systems. See 34 Fed. 
Reg. 11,148. In 1971, however, the agency observed that "some belt-
based concepts have been advanced that appear to be capable of meeting 
the complete passive protection options," leading it to add a new section to 
the proposed standard "to deal expressly with passive belts." 36 Fed. 
Reg. 12,858, 12,859 (July 8, 1971). 
5 The court did hold that the testing procedures required of passive 
belts did not satisfy the Safety Act's requirement that standards be "objec-
tive." 472 F. 2d., at 675. 
- -
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ers chose the "ignition interlock" option, a decision which was 
highly unpopular, and led Congress to amend the Act to pro-
hibit a motor vehicle safety standard from requiring or per-
mitting compliance by means of an ignition interlock or a con-
tinuous buzzer designed to indicate that safety belts were not 
in use. Motor Vehicle and Schoolbus Safety Amendments of 
1974, Pub. L. 93-492, § 109, 88 Stat. 1482, 15 U. S. C. 
§ 1410b(b). The 1974 Amendments also provided that any 
safety standard that could be satisfied by a system other than 
seatbelts would have to be submitted to Congress where it 
could be vetoed by concurrent resolution of both houses . 15 
U. S. C. § 1410b(b)(2). 6 
The effective date for mandatory passive restraint systems 
was extended for a year until August 31, 1976. 40 Fed. Reg. 
16,217 (April 10, 1975); id. at 33,977 (Aug. 13, 1975). But in 
June 1976, Secretary of Transportation William Coleman ini-
tiated a new rulemaking on the issue, 41 Fed. Reg. 24,070 
(June 9, 1976). After hearing testimony and reviewing writ-
ten comments, Coleman extended the optional alternatives 
indefinitely and suspended the passive restraint require-
ment. Although he found passive restraints technologically 
and economically feasible, the Secretary based his decision on 
the expectation that there would be widespread public resis-
tance to the new systems. He instead proposed a dem-
onstration project involving up to 500,000 cars installed with 
passive restraints, in order to smooth the way for public ac-
ceptance of mandatory passive restraints at a later date . 
Department of Transportation, The Secretary's Decision 
Concerning Motor Vehicle Occupant Crash Protection (De-
cember 6, 1976). 
• To comply with the Amendments, NHTSA proposed new warning sys-
tems to replace the prohibited continuous buzzers. 39 Fed. Reg. 42,692 
(Dec. 6, 1974). More significantly, NHTSA was forced to rethink an earlier 
decision which contemplated use of the interlocks in tandem with detach-
able belts. See n. )4, infra. 
13 
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Coleman's successor as Secretary of Transportation dis-
agreed. Within months of assuming office, Secretary Brock 
Adams decided that the demonstration project was unnec-
essary. He issued a new mandatory passive restraint regu-
lation, known as Modified Standard 208. 42 Fed. Reg. 
34,289 (July 5, 1977); 42 CFR § 571.208 (1977). The Modified 
Standard mandated the phasing in of passive restraints be-
ginning with large cars in model year 1982 and extending to 
all cars by model year 1984. The two principal systems that 
would satisfy the Standard were airbags and passive belts, 
leaving to the manufacturers the choice of which system to 
install. In Pacific Legal Foundation v. Dep't of Transporta-
tion, 593 F. 2d 1338 (CADC), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 830 
(1979), the Court of Appeals upheld Modified Standard 208 as 
a rational, nonarbitrary regulation consistent with the agen-
cy's mandate under the Act. The standard also survived 
scrutiny by Congress, which did not exercise its authority 
under the legislative veto prov1s1on of the 1974 
Amendments. 7 
Over the next several years, the automobile industry 
geared up to comply with Modified Standard 208. As late as 
July, 1980 NHTSA reported: 
"On the road experience in thousands of vehicles 
equipped with airbags and automatic safety belts has 
confirmed agency estimates of the life-saving and injury-
preventing benefits of such systems. When all cars are 
equipped with automatic crash protection systems, each 
year an estimated 9,000 more lives will be saved and tens 
of thousands of serious injuries will be prevented." 
NHTSA Prog. Rep., 4 (Rec. 1627). 
7 No action was taken by the full House of Representatives. The Sen-
ate committee with jurisdiction over NHTSA affirmatively endorsed the 
standard, S. Rep. No. 481, 95th cong., 1st Sess. (1977), and a resolution of 
disapproval was tabled by the Senate. 123 Cong. Rec. 33,332 (1977). 
--..! - -
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In February 1981, however, Secretary of Transportation An-
drew Lewis reopened the rulemaking due to changed eco-
nomic circumstances and, in particular, the difficulties of the 
automobile industry. 46 Fed. Reg. 12,033 (Feb. 12, 1981). 
Two months later, the agency ordered a one-year delay in the 
application of the standard to large cars, extending the dead-
line to September 1982, 46 Fed. Reg. 21,172 (April 9, 1981) 
and at the same time, proposed the possible rescission of the 
entire standard. 46 Fed. Reg. 21,205 (April 9, 1981). After 
receiving written comments and holding public hearings, 
NHTSA issued a final rule (Notice 25) that rescinded the pas-
sive restraint requirement contained in Modified Standard 
208. 
II 
In a statement explaining the rescission, NHTSA main-
tained that it was no longer able to find, as it had in 1977, that 
the automatic restraint requirement would produce signifi-
cant safety benefits. Notice 25, 46 Fed. Reg. 53,419 (Oct. 
29, 1981). This judgment reflected not a change of opinion 
on the effectiveness of the technology, but a change in plans 
by the automobile industry. In 1977, the agency had as-
sumed that airbags would be installed in 60% of all new cars 
and automatic seatbelts in 40%. By 1981 it became apparent 
that automobile manufacturers planned to install the auto-
matic seatbelts in approximately 99% of the new cars. For 
this reason, the life-saving potential of airbags would not be 
realized. Moreover, it now appeared that the overwhelming 
majority of passive belts planned to be installed by manufac-
turers could be easily detached and left that way perma-
nently. Passive belts, once detached, then required "the 
same type of affirmative action that is the stumbling block to 
obtaining high usage levels of manual belts." For this rea-
son, the agency concluded that there was no longer a basis for 
reliably predicting that the standard would lead to any sig-
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In view of the possibly minimal safety benefits, the auto-
matic restraint requirement no longer was reasonable or 
practicable in the agency's view. The requirement would re-
quire approximately $1 billion to implement and the agency 
did not believe it would be reasonable to impose such sub-
stantial costs on manufacturers and consumers without more 
adequate assurance that sufficient safety benefits would ac-
crue. In addition, NHTSA concluded that automatic re-
straints might have an adverse effect on the public's attitude 
toward safety. Given the high expense and limited benefits 
~ detachable belts, NHTSA feared that many consumers 
would regard the standard as an instance of ineffective regu-
lation, adversely affecting the public's view of safety regula-
tion and, in particular, "poisoning popular sentiment toward 
efforts to improve occupant restraint systems in the future." 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. and the Na-
tional Association of Independent Insurers filed petitions for 
review of NHTSA's rescission of the passive restraint stand-
ard. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit held that the agency's rescission of the pas-
sive restraint requirement was arbitrary and capricious. 
680 F. 2d 206 (1982). While observing that rescission is not 
unrelated to an agency's refusal to take action in the first in-
stance, the court concluded that, in this case, NHTSA's dis-
cretion to rescind the passive restraint requirement had been 
restricted by various forms of congressional 'reaction' to the 
passive restraint issue. It then proceeded to find that the 
rescission of Standard 208 was arbitrary and capricious for 
three reasons. First, the court found insufficient as a basis 
for rescission NHTSA's conclusion that it could not reliably 
predict an increase in belt usage under the Standard. The 
court held that there was insufficient evidence in the record 
to sustain NHTSA's position on this issue, and that, "only a 
well-justified refusal to seek more evidence could render re-
- -
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scission non-arbitrary." 680 F. 2d at 232. Second, a major-
ity of the panel 8 concluded that NHTSA inadequately consid-
ered the possibility of requiring manufacturers to install 
non-detachable rather than detachable passive belts. Third, 
the majority found that the agency acted arbitrarily and ca-
priciously by failing to give any consideration whatever to re-
quiring compliance with Standard 208 by the installation of 
airbags. 
The court allowed NHTSA 30 days in which to submit a 
schedule for "resolving the questions raised in the opinion." 
680 F. 2d, at 242. Subsequently, the agency filed a Notice of 
Proposed Supplemental Rulemaking setting forth a schedule 
for complying with the court's mandate. On August 4, 1982, 
the court of Appeals issued an order staying the compliance 
date for the passive restraint requirement until September 1, 
1983, and requested NHTSA to inform the Court whether 
that compliance date was achievable. NHTSA informed the 
court on October 1, 1982 that based on representations by 
manufacturers, it did not appear that practicable compliance 
could be achieved before September 1985. On November 8, 
1982, we granted certiorari, -- U. S. -- (1982), and on 
November 18, the court of appeals entered an order recalling 
its mandate. 
III 
Unlike the Court of Appeals, we do not find the appropri-
ate scope of judicial review to be the "most troublesome ques-
tion" in the case. Both the Motor Vehicle Safety Act and the 
1974 Amendments to the Act concerning occupant crash pro-
tection standards indicate that motor vehicle safety stand-
ards are to be promulgated under the informal rulemaking 
procedures of § 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 
U. S. C. § 553 (1976). The agency's action in promulgating 
such standards therefore may be set aside if found to be "ar-
8Judge Edwards did not join the majority's reasoning on these points. 
,. - -
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bitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law." 5 U. S. C. § 706(2)(A). Citizens to 
Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U. S., 402, 414 (1971); 
Bowman Transportation, Inc . v. Arkansas-Best freight 
System, Inc., 419 U. S. 281 (1974). We believe that the re-
scission or modification of an occupant protection standard is 
subject to the same test. Section 103(b) of the Motor Vehi-
cle Safety Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1392(b), states that the proce-
dural and judicial review provisions of the Administrative 
Procedure Act "shall apply to all orders establishing, amend-
ing, or revoking a Federal motor vehicle safety standard," 
and suggests no difference in the scope of judicial review de-
pending upon the nature of the agency's action. 
Petitioner Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association 
(MVMA) disagrees, contending that the rescission of an 
agency rule should be judged by the same standard a court 
would use to judge an agency's refusal to promulgate a rule in 
the first place-a standard Petitioner believes considerably 
narrower than the traditional arbitrary and capricious test 
and "close to the borderline of nonreviewability." MVMA 
Brief at 35. We reject this view. The Safety Act expressly 
equates orders "revoking" and "establishing" safety stand-
ards; neither that Act nor the AP A suggests that revocations 
are to be treated as refusals to promulgate standards. Peti-
tioner's view would render meaningless Congress' authoriza-
tion for judicial review of orders revoking safety rules. 
Moreover, the revocation of an extant regulation is substan-
tially different than a failure to act. Revocation constitutes 
a reversal of the agency's former views as to the proper 
course. A "settled course of behavior embodies the agency's 
informed judgment that, by pursuing that course, it will 
carry out the policies committed to it by Congress. There is, 
then, at least a presumption that those policies will be carried 
out best if the settled rule is adhered to." Atchison, Topeka 
& Santa Fe Ry. v. Wichita Bd of Trade, 412 U. S. 800, 
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by rescinding a rule is obligated to supply a reasoned analysis 
for the change beyond that which may be required when an 
agency does not act in the first instance. 
In so holding, we fully recognize that "regulatory agencies 
do not establish rules of conduct to last forever," American 
Trucking Assoc., Inc. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 
387 U. S. 397, 416 (1967), and that an agency must be given 
ample latitude to "adapt their rules and policies to the de-
mands of changing circumstances." Permian Bas"in Area 
Rate Cases, 390 U. S. 747, 784 (1968). But the forces of 
change do not always or necessarily point in the direction of 
deregulation. In the abstract, there is no more reason to 
presume that changing circumstances require the rescission 
of prior action, instead of a revision in or even the extension 
of current regulation. If Congress established a presump-
tion from which judicial review should start, that presump-
tion- contrary to petitioner's views-is not against safety 
regulation, but against changes in current policy that are not 
justified by the rulemaking record. While the removal of a 
regulation may not entail the monetary expenditures and 
other costs of enacting a new standard, and accordingly, it 
may be easier for an agency to justify a deregulatory action, 
the direction in which an agency chooses to move does not al-
ter the standard of judicial review established by law. 
The Department of Transportation accepts the applicabil-
ity of the "arbitrary and capricious" standard. It argues 
that under this standard, a reviewing court may not set aside 
an agency rule that is rational, based on consideration of the 
relevant factors and within the scope of the authority dele-
gated to the agency by the statute. We do not disagree with 
this formulation . 9 The scope of review under the "arbitrary 
9 The Department of Transportation suggests that the aribtrary and ca-
pricious standard requires no more than the minimum rationality a statute 
must bear in order to withstand analysis under the Due Process Clause. 
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and capricious" standard is narrow and a court is not to sub-
stitute its judgment for that of the agency. Nevertheless, 
the agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a 
satisfactory explanation for its action including a "rational 
connection between the facts found and the choice made." 
Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U. S. 156, 168 
(1962). In reviewing that explanation, we must "consider 
whether the decision was based on a consideration of the rele-
vant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judg-
ment." Bowman Transp . v. Ark.-Best Freight System, 
supra, at 285; Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 
supra, at 416. Normally, an agency rule would be arbi-
trary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors which 
Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to 
consider an important aspect of the _problem, offered an ex- ~ 
planation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence 
before the agency, or is so implausibl'e that it could not be as-
cribed to a difference in view or the product of agency exper-
tise. The reviewing court should not attempt itself to make 
up for such deficiencies: "We may not supply a reasoned basis 
for the agency's action that the agency itself has not given." 
SEC v. Chenery Corp ., 332 U. S. 194, 196 (1947). We will, 
however, uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the 
agency's path may reasonably be discerned." Bowman 
Transp. v. Ark. -Best Freight Systems, supra, at 286. See 
also Camp v. Pitts, 411 U. S. 138, 142 (per curiam). For 
purposes of this case, it is also relevant that CongTess re-
quired a record of the rulemakingproceedings to be compiled 
and submitted to a reviewing court, 15 U. S. C. § 1394, and 
intended that agency findings under the Motor Vehicle 
Safety Act would be supported by "substantial evidence on 
the record considered as a whole." S. Rep. No. 1301, 89th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1966); H. R. Rep. No. 1776, 89th Cong., 2d 
legislation drafted by Congress and the presumption of regularity afforded 
an agency in fulfilling its statutory mandate. 
/I 
Jµ. J ( ?) 
? 
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Sess. 21 (1966). 
IV 
The Court of Appeals correctly found that the arbitrary 
and capricious test applied to rescissions of prior agency 
regulations, but then erred in intensifying the scope of its re-
view based upon its reading of legislative events. It held 
that congressional reaction to various versions of Standard 
208 "raise[d] doubts" that NHTSA's rescission "necessarily 
demonstrates an effort to fulfill its statutory mandate," and 
therefore the agency was obligated to provide "increasingly 
clear and convincing reasons" for its action. 680 F. 2d at 222, 
229. Specifically, the Court of Appeals found significance in 
three legislative occurences: 
"In 1974, Congress banned the ignition interlock but did 
not foreclose NHTSA's pursuit of a passive restraint 
standard. In 1977, Congress allowed the standard to 
take effect when neither of the concurrent resolutions 
needed for disapproval was passed. In 1980, a majority 
of each house indicated support for the concept of man-
datory passive restraints and a majority of each house 
supported the unprecedented attempt to require some 
installation of airbags." 680 F . 2d, at 228. 
From these legislative acts and non-acts the court of appeals 
derived a "congressional commitment to the concept of auto-
matic crash protection devices for vehicle occupants." I cl. 
This path of analysis was misguided and the inferences it 
produced are questionable. It is noteworthy that in this 
Court Respondent State Farm expressly agrees that the 
post-enactment legislative history of the Safety Act does not 
heighten the standard of review of NHTSA's actions. Brief of 
Respondents State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 
at 13. State Farm's concession is well-taken for this Court 
has never suggested that the standard of review is enlarged 
or diminished by subsequent congressional action. While an 
agency's interpretation of a statute may be confirmed or rati-
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fled ubsequent Congressional failure to chan e that 
intepretation, o ones niversity v. United States, --
U. s:- -, , - (1983); Haig v. Agee, 453 U. S. 280, 291-300 
(1981), in the case before us, even an unequivocal ratifica-
tion- short of statutory incorporation-of the passive re-
straint standard would not connote approval or disapproval of 
an agency's later decision to rescind the regulation. That 
decision remains subject to the arbitrary and capricious 
standard. 
. That we should not be so quick to infer a Congressional 
mandate for passive restraints is confirmed by examining the 
post-enactment legislative events cited by the Court of Ap-
peals. Even were we inclined to rely on inchoate legislative 
action, the inferences to be drawn fail to to suggest that the 
NHTSA acted improperly in rescinding Standard 208. 
First, in 1974 a mandatory passive restraint standard was 
¥Ot t:6 be pl omarg~ Congress had no reason to preempt 
that course. Moreover, one can hardly infer support for a 
mandatory standard from Congress' decision to provide that 
such a reg11lation would be subject to disapproval by resolu-
tions of disapproval in both houses. Similarly, no mandate 
can be divined from the tabling of resolutions of disapproval 
which were introduced in 1977. The failure of Congress to ex-
ercise its veto might reflect legislative deference to the agen-
cy's expertise and does not indicate that Congress would dis-
approve of the agency's action in 1981. And even if 
Congress favored the standard in 1977, it_:_like NHTSA-
may well reach a different judgment given changed circum-
stances four years later. Finally, the Court of Appeals read 
too much into floor action on the 1980 authorization bill, a bill 
which was not enacted into law. Other contemporaneous 
events could be read as showing equal congressional hostility 
to passive restraints. 10 
1° For example, an overwhelming majority of the House of Represent-
atives voted in favor of a proposal to ban mandatory passive restraints. 
125 Cong. Rec. Hl2285, Hl2287 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1979). 
.__/ 
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V 
The ultimate question before us is whether NHTSA's re-
scission of Standard 208 was arbitrary and capricious. We 
conclude, as did the Court of Appeals, that it was. We also 
conclude, but for somewhat different reasons, that further 
consideration of the issue by the agency is therefore re-
quired. We deal separately with the rescission as it applies 
to airbags and as it applies to seatbelts. 
A 
The first and most obvious reason for finding the rescission 
arbitrary and capricious is that NHTSA apparently gave no 
consideration whatever to modifying the Standard to require 
that airbag technology be utilized. Standard 208 sought to 
achieve automatic crash protection by requiring automobile 
manufactuers to install either of two passive restraint de-
vices: airbags or automatic seatbelts. There was no sugges-
tion in the long rulemaking process that led to Standard 208 
that if only one of these options were feasible, no passive re-
straint standard should be promulgated. Indeed, the agen-
cy's original proposed standard contemplated the installation 
of inflatable restraints in all cars. 11 Automatic belts were 
added as a means of complying with the standard because 
they were believed to be as effective as airbags in achieving 
the goal of occupant crash protection. 36 Fed. Reg. 12,858, 
12,859 (July 8, 1971). At that time, the passive belt ap-
proved by the agency could not be detached. 12 Only later, at 
11 While NHTSA's 1970 passive restraint requirement permitted compli-
ance by means other than the airbag, 35 Fed. Reg. 16,927,(1970), "[t]his 
rule was [a] de facto air bag mandate since no other technologies were 
available to comply with the standard." J. Graham & P. Gorham, 
NHTRSA and Passive Restraints: A Case of Arbitrary and Capricious De-
regulation, 35 Admin. L. Rev. 193, 197 (1983). See n. 4, supra. 
12 Although the agency suggested that passive restraint systems contain 
an emergency release mechanism to allow easy extrication of passengers in 
the event of an accident, the agency cautioned that "[i]n the case of passive 
belts, it would be required that the release not cause belt separation, and 
- -
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a manufacturer's behest, did the agency approve of the 
detachability feature-and only after assurances that the fea-
ture would not compromise the safety benefits of the re-
straint. 13 Although it was then foreseen that 60% of the new 
cars would contain airbags and 40% would have automatic 
seatbelts, the ratio between the two was not significant as 
long as the passive belt would also assure greater passenger 
safety. 
The agency has now determined that the detachable auto-
matic belts will not attain anticipated safety benefits because 
so many individuals will detach the mechanism. Even if this 
conclusion were acceptable in its entirety, see infra at --, 
standing alone it would not justify any more than an amend-
ment of Standard 208 to disallow compliance by means of the 
one technology which will not provide effective passenger 
protection. It does not cast doubt on the need for a passive 
restraint standard or upon the efficacy of airbag technology. 
In its most recent rule-making, the agency again acknowl-
edged the life-saving potential of the airbag: 
"The agency has no basis at this time for changing its 
earlier conclusions in 1976 and 1977 that basic airbag 
technology is sound and has been sufficiently demon-
strated to be effective in those vehicles in current use 
. . . . " NHTSA Final Regulatory Impact Analysis 
(RIA) at XI-4 (Rec. 264). 
that the system be self-restoring after operation of the release." 36 Fed. 
Reg. 12,866 (July 8, 1971). 
13 In April 1974, NHTSA adopted the suggestion of an automobile manu-
facturer that emergency release of passive belts be accomplished by a con-
ventional latch-provided the restraint system was guarded by an ignition 
interlock and warning buzzer to encourage reattachment of the passive 
belt. 39 Fed. Reg. 14,593 (April 25, 1974). When the 1974 Amend-
ments prohibited these devices, the agency simply eliminated the interlock 
and buzzer requirements, but continued to allow compliance by a detach-
able passive belt. 
- -
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Given the effectiveness ascribed to airbag technology by the 
agency, the mandate of the Safety Act to achieve traffic 
safety would suggest that the logical response to the change 
in seatbelt technology would be to require the installation of 
airbags. At the very least this alternative way of achieving 
the ends of the Act should have been addressed and adequate 
reasons given for its abandonment. But the agency not only 
did not require compliance through airbags, it did not even 
consider the possibility in its 1981 rulemaking. Not one sen-
tence of its rulemaking statement discusses the airbags-only 
option. Because, as the Court of Appeals stated, "NHTSA's 
.. . analysis of airbags was nonexistent," 680 F. 2d, at 236, 
what we said in Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 
supra, at 167, is appropos here: 
"There are no findings and no analysis here to justify the 
choice made, no indication of the basis on which the 
[agency] exercised its expert discretion. We are not 
prepared to and the Administrative Procedure Act will 
not permit us to accept such . .. practice. . .. Expert 
discretion is the lifeblood of the administrative process, 
but 'unless we make the requirements for administrative 
action strict and demanding, expertise, the strength of 
modern government, can become a monster which rules 
with no practical limits on its discretion.' New York v. 
United States, 342 U. S. 882, 884 (dissenting opinion)." 
(footnote omitted) 
We have frequently reiterated that an agency must cogently 
explain why it has exercised its direction in a given manner, 
Atchison, T & S .F .R . Co. v. Wichita Ed. of Trade, 412 U.S 
800, 806 (1973); FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U. S. 
233, 249 (1972); NLRB v. Metropolitan Ins. Co., 380 U. S. 
438, 443 (1965); and we reaffirm this principle again today. 
The automobile industry has opted for the passive belt 
over the airbag, but surely it is not enough that the regulated 
industry has eschewed a given safety device. For nearly a 
- -
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decade, the automobile industry waged the regulatory equiv-
alent of war against the airbag and lost-the inflatable re-
straint was incontrovertibly proven effective. The only 
thing which has changed is that now the automobile industry 
has decided to employ a belt system which will not meet the 
safety objectives of Standard 208. This hardly constitutes 
cause to revoke the standard itself. Indeed, the Safety Act 
was necessary because the industry was not sufficiently re-
sponsive to safety concerns. The Act intended that safety 
standards not depend on current technology and could be 
"technology-forcing" in the sense of inducing the develop-
ment of superior safety design. See Chrylser Corp. v. Dept. 
of Transp., 472 F. 2d 659, 672-673 (CA 6 1972). If, under 
the statute, the agency should not defer to the industry's fail-
ure to develop safer cars, which it surely should not do, afor-
tiori it may not revoke a safety standard which can be~ 
satisfied by current technology simply because the industry 
has opted for an ineffective seatbelt design. 
Although the agency did not address the mandatory 
airbags option and the Court of Appeals noted that "airbags 
seem to have none of the problems that NHTSA identified in 
passive seatbelts," petitioners recite a number of difficulties 
that they believe would be posed by a mandatory airbag 
standard. These range from questions concerning the instal-
lation of airbags in small cars to that of adverse public reac-
tion. But these are not the agency's reasons for rejecting a 
mandatory airbag standard. Not having considered the pos-
sibility, the agency submitted no reasons at all. The short-
and sufficient- answer is that the courts may not accept ap-
pellate counsel's post hoc rationalizations for agency action. 
Burlington Truck Lines, 371 U. S. at 168. It is well-estab-
lished that an agency's action must be upheld, if at all, on the 
basis articulated by the agency itself. Id.; Chenery v. SEC, 
332 U. S. 194, 196 (1945); American Textile Manufacturers 
Inst . v. Donovan, 452 U. S. 490, 539 (1981).14 
"The Department of Transportation expresses concern that adoption of 
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Petitioners also invoke our decision in Vermont Yankee 
Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U. S. 519 (1977), as 
though it were a talisman under which any agency decision is 
by definition unimpeachable. Specifically, it is submitted 
that to require an agency to consider an airbags-only alterna-
tive is to, in essence, dictate to the the agency the procedures 
it is to follow. Petitioners both misread Vermont Yankee 
and misconstrue the nature of the remand that is in order. 
In Vermont Yankee, we held that a court may not impose ad-
ditional procedural requirements upon an agency. We do 
not require today any specific procedures which NHTSA 
must follow. Nor do we broadly require an agency to con-
sider all policy alternatives in reaching decision. It is true 
that a rulemaking "cannot be found wanting simply because 
the agency failed to include every alternative device and 
thought conceivable by the mind of man . . . regardless of 
how uncommon or unknown that alternative might have 
been." 435 U. S., at 551. But the airbag is more than a pol-
icy alternative to the passive restraint standard; it is a tech-
nological alternative within the ambit of the existing stand-
ard. We hold only that given the judgment made in 1977 
that airbags were an effective and cost-beneficial life-saving 
technology, that judgment may not be reversed without any 
consideration whatsoever of an airbags-only requirement. 
B 
Although the issue is closer, we also find that the agency 
an airbags-only requirement would have required a new notice of proposed 
rulemaking. Even if this were so, and we need not decide the question, it 
would not constitute sufficient cause to rescind the passive restraint re-
quirement. The Department also asserts that it was reasonable to with-
.draw the requirement as written to avoid forcing manufacturers from 
spending resources to comply with an ineffective safety initiative. We 
think that it would have been permissible for the agency to temporarily 
suspend the passive restraint requirement or to delay its implementation 
date while an airbags mandate was studied. But, as we explain in text, 
that option had to be considered before the passive restraint requirement 
could be revoked. 
- -
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was too quick to dismiss the safety benefits of automatic 
seatbelts. NHTSA's critical finding was that, in light of the 
industry's plans to install readily detachable passive belts, it 
could not could not reliably predict "even a 5 percentage 
point increase as the minimum level of expected usage in-
crease." 46 Fed. Reg. 53,421-23. The Court of Appeals re-
jected this finding because there is "not one iota" of evidence 
that Modified Standard 208 will fail to increase nationwide 
seatbelt use by at least 13 percentage points, the level of in-
creased usage necessary for the standard to justify its cost. 
Given the lack of probative evidence, the Court held that 
"only a well-justified refusal to seek more evidence could ren-
der rescission non-arbitrary." 680 F. 2d, at 232. 
Petitioners object to this conclusion. In their view, "sub-
stantial uncertainty" that a regulation will accomplish its in-
tended purpose is sufficient reason, without more, to rescind 
a regulation. We agree with petitioners that just as an 
agency reasonably may decline to issue a safety standard if it 
is uncertain about its efficacy, an agency may also revoke a 
standard on the basis of serious uncertainties if supported by 
the record and reasonably explained. Rescission of the pas-
sive restraint requirement would not be arbitrary and capri-
cious simply because there was no evidence in direct support 
of the agency's conclusion. It is not infrequent that the 
available data does not settle a regulatory issue and the 
agency must then exercise its judgment in moving from the 
facts and probabilities on the record to a policy conclusion. 
Recognizing that policymaking in a complex society must ac-
count for uncertainty, however, does not imply that it is suffi-
cient for an agency to merely recite the terms "substantial 
uncertainty" as a justification for its actions. The agency 
must explain the evidence which is available, and must offer a 
"rational connection between the facts found and the choice 
made." Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 
supra, at 168. Generally, one aspect of that explanation 
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would be a justification for rescinding the regulation before 
engaging in a search for further evidence. 
In this case, the agency's explanation for rescission of the 
passive restraint requirement is not sufficient to enable us to 
conclude that the rescission was the product of reasoned deci-
sionmaking. To reach this conclusion, we do not upset the 
agency's view of the facts, but we do appreciate the limita-
tions of this record in supporting the agency's decision. We 
start with the accepted ground that if used, seatbelts unques-
tionably would save many thousands of lives and would pre-
vent tens of thousands of crippling injuries. Unlike recent 
regulatory decisions we have reviewed, Industrial Union 
Department v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U. 8. 607 
(1980); American Textile Maniifactuers Inst., Inc. v. Dono-
van, 452 U. S. 490 (1981), the safety benefits of wearing 
seatbelts are not in doubt and it is not challenged that that 
were those benefits to accrue, the monetary costs of imple-
menting the standard would be easily justified. We move 
next to the fact that there is no direct evidence in support of 
the agency's finding that detachable automatic belts cannot 
be predicted to yield a substantial increase in usage. The 
empirical evidence on the record, consisting of surveys of 
drivers of automobiles equipped with passive belts, reveals 
more than a doubling of the usage rate experienced with 
manual belts. 15 Much of the agency's rulemaking state-
ment-and much of the controversy in this case--centers on 
15 Between 1975 and 1980, Volkswagen sold approximately 350,000 Rab-
bits equipped with detachable passive seatbelts that were guarded by an 
ignition inrerlock. General Motors sold 8,000 1978 and 1979 Chevettes 
with a similar system, but eliminated the ignition interlock on the 13,000 
Chevettes sold in 1980. NHTSA found that belt usage in the Rabbits av-
eraged 34% for manual belts and 84% for passive belts. Regulatory Im-
pact Analysis (RIA) at IV-52, App. 108. For the 1978-1979 Chevettes, 
NHTSA calculated 34% usage of manual belts and 71 % for passive belts. 
On 1980 Chevettes, the agency found these figures to be 31 % for manual 
belts and 70% for passive belts. Id. 
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the conclusions that should be drawn from these studies. 
The agency maintained that the doubling of seatbelt usage in 
these studies could not be extrapolated to an across-the-
board mandatory standard because the passive seatbelts 
were guarded by ignition interlocks and purchasers of the 
tested cars are somewhat atypical. 16 Respondents insist 
these studies demonstrate that Modified standard 208 will 
substantially increase seat belt usage. We believe that it is 
within the agency's discretion to pass upon the 
generalizability of these field studies. This is precisely the 
type of issue which rests within the expertise of NHTSA, and 
upon which a reviewing court must be most hesitant to 
intrude. 
But accepting the agency's view of the field tests on pas-
sive restraints indicates only that there is no reliable real-
world experience that usage rates will substantially increase. 
To be sure, NHTSA opines that "it cannot reliably predict 
even a 5 percentage point increase as the minimum level of 
increased usage." Notice 25 at (104a). But this and other 
statements that passive belts will not yield substantial in-
creases in seatbelt usage apparently take no account of the 
critical difference between detachable automatic belts and 
current manual belts. A detached passive belt does require 
an affirmative act to reconnect it, but-unlike a manual seat 
belt- the passive belt, once reattached, will continue to func-
tion automatically unless again disconnected. Thus, iner-
tia- a factor which the agency's own studies have found sig-
nificant in explaining the current low usage rates for 
seatbelts li_works in favor of, not against, use of the protec-
16 "NHTSA believes that the usage of automatic belts in Rabbits and 
Chevettes would have been substantially lower if the automatic belts in 
those cars were not equipped with a use-inducing device inhibiting detach-
ment ... " Notice 25 at (102a). 
17 NHTSA commissioned a number of surveys of public attitudes in an 
effort to better understand why people were not using manual belts and 
todetermine how they would react to passive restraints. The surveys re-
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tive device. Since 20 to 50% of motorists currently wear 
seatbelts on some occasions, there would seem to be grounds 
to believe that seatbelt use by occasional users will be sub-
stantially increased by the detachable passive belts. 
Whether this is in fact the case is a matter for the agency to 
decide, but it must bring its expertise to bear on the 
question. 
The agency, of course, is correct to look at the costs as well 
as the benefits of Standard 208. The agency's conclusion 
that the incremental costs of the requirements were no 
longer reasonable was predicated on its prediction that the 
safety benefits of the regulation might be minimal. Specifi-
cally, the agency's fears that the public may resent to pay 
more for the automatic belt systems depends is expressly de-
pendent on the assumption that detachable automatic belts 
will not produce more than "negligible safety benefits." 
When the agency reexamines its findings as to the likely in-
crease in seat belt usage, it must also reconsider its judgment 
of the monetary and other costs of the Standard. In reach-
ing its judgment, NHTSA should bear in mind that Congress 
intended safety to be the preeminent factor under the Motor 
Vehicle Safety Act: 
"The Commitee intends that safety shall be the overrid-
ing consideration in the issuance of standards under this 
bill. The Committee recognizes ... that the Secretary 
will necessarily consider reasonableness of cost, feasibil-
ity and adequate leadtime." S. Rep. No. 1301 at 6. 
veal that while 20% to 40% of the public is opposed to wearing manual 
belts , the larger proportion of the population does not wear belts because 
they forgot or found manual belts inconvenient or bothersome. RIA at 
IV-25; App. 81. In another survey, 38% of the surveyed group responded 
that they would welcome automatic belts, and 25% would "tolerate" them. 
See RIA at IV-37. App. 93. NHTSA did not comment upon these attitude 
surveys in its explanation accompanying the rescission of the passive re-
straint requirement. 
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"In establishing standards the Secretary must conform 
to the requirement that the standard be practicable. 
This would require consideration of all relevant factors, 
including technological abiity to achieve the goal of a par-
ticular standard as well as consideration of economic fac-
tors. Motor vehicle safety is the paramount purpose of 
this bill and each standard must be related thereto." H. 
Rep. No. 1776 at 16. 
The agency also failed to articulate a basis for not requiring 
nondetachable belts under Standard 208. It is argued that the 
current concern of the agency with the easy detachability of 
the currently favored design would be readily solved by a 
continuous passive belt, which allows the occupant to "spool 
out" the belt and create the necessary slack for easy extrica-
tion from the car. The agency did not separately consider 
the continuous belt option, but treated it together with the 
ignition interlock device in a category it titled "option of use-
compelling features ." The agency was concerned that use-
compelling devices would "complicate extrication of an occu-
pant from the car." "To require that passive belts contain 
use-compelling features," the agency observed, "could be 
counterproductive [given] .. . widespread, latent and irratio-
nal fear in many members of the public that they could be 
trapped by the seat belt after a crash." In addition, based 
on the experience with the ignition interlock, the agency 
feared that use-compelling features might trigger adverse 
public reaction. 
By failing to analyze the continuous seatbelts in its own 
right, the agency has failed to offer the rational connection 
between facts and judgment required to pass muster under 
the arbitrary and capricious standard. We agree with the 
Court of Appeals that NHTSA did not suggest that the emer-
gency release mechanisms used in nondetachable belts are 
any less effective for emergency egress than the buckle re-
lease system used in detachable belts. In 1978, when Gen-
eral Motors obtained the agency's approval to install a con-
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tinuous passive belt, it assured the agency that 
nondetachable belts with spool releases were as safe asd de-
tachable belts with buckle releases. 43 Fed. Reg. 21,912, 
21,913-14 (1978). NHTSA was satisfied that this belt design 
assured easy extricability: "the agency does not believe that 
the use of [such] release mechanisms will cause serious occu-
pant egress problems . . . " 43 Fed. Reg. 52,493, 52,494 
(1978). While the agency is entitled to change its view on 
the acceptability of continuous passive belts, it is obligated to 
explain its reasons for doing so. 
The agency also failed to offer any explanation, of why a 
continuous passive belt would engender the same adverse 
public reaction as the ignition interlock, and, as the court of 
appeals concluded, "every indication in the record points the 
other way." -- F. 2d at - - .18 We see no basis for 
equating the two devices: the continous belt, unlike the igni-
tion interlock, does not interfere with the operation of the 
car. More importantly, it is the agency's responsibility, not 
this Court's, to explain its decision. 
V 
"An agency's view of what is in the public interest may 
change, either with or without a change in circumstances. 
' But an agency changing its course must supply a reasoned 
analysis ... " Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 
F. 2d 841, 852 (CA DC), cert. denied, 403 U. S. 923 (1971). 
We do not accept all of the reasoning of the court of appeals 
but we do conclude that the agency has failed to supply the 
requisite "reasoned analysis" in this case. Accordingly, we 
vacate the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the 
case to that court with directions to remand the matter to the 
18 The Court of Appeals noted previous agency statements distinguishing 
interlocks from passive restraints. 42 Fed. Reg. at 34,290; 36 Fed. Reg. 
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NHTSA for further consideration consistent with this 
opinion. 19 
So ordered. 
19 Petitioners construe the court of appeals's order of August 4, 1982 as 
setting an implementation date for Standard 208, in violation of Vermont 
Yankee's injunction against setting such time constraints. Vermont Yankee 
Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U. S., at 544-545. Respondents 
maintain that the court of appeals simply stayed the effectiveness date of 
Standard 208, which not having been validly rescinded, would have re-
quired mandatory passive restraints for new cars after September 1, 1982. 
We need not choose between these views because the agency had sufficient 
justification to suspend, although not to rescind, Standard 208, pending the 
further consideration required by the court of appeals, and now, by us. 
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My vote in Confe r ence was to agree with the Court of Appeals 
insofar as it held that NHTSA should have, but did not, explain 
why Standard 208 was revoked as to airbags as well as seatbelts. 
Since I inherited this case from Bill, I take it that the Chief 
and Bill read the Conference action as affording at least a 
r easonable chance of producing a court on the above basis. 
The proposed opinion that I am now circulating first 
disagrees with the Court of Appeals to~ ome extent with respect 
to its approach to the case. It then faults the NHTSA for not 
dealing with the airbags issue in revoking the Standard 208. The 
draft then goes farther t h.an t h e Con ference ~ote would seem to 
support by f iriafng' NHTSA's explanation f or revoking the seatbelt 
standard to be inadequate in certain respects. These are much 
'\1111/ closer calls than the airbags issue, but if the case is to go 
J bac r ur er e ana 1On 1n any event, perhaps NHTSA should 
give some attention to these matters also. I doubt that it would 




MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Mark 
Re: Motor Vehicle Manufs. Ass'n v. State Farm, No. 82-354 
Justice White's opinion has circulated and, as in numer-
ous cases he has been assigned this year, he has taken an ap-
proach different from the Conference vote. 
This memo will be brief, because I think a prompt decision 
on your part may be indicated. TM and JPS already have joined, 
and I would predict that WJB may follow suit. y 
As you may recall, the NHTSA rule in this case called for 
either airbags or passive seatbelts. The agency determined that 
99% of all manufacturers would comply by using detachable passive 
seatbelts. It further found that the detachable feature made it 
unlikely that seatbelt usage would increase significantly. 
Therefore, the entire rule was rescinded. 
BRW holds that the agency erred in three ways: 
(i) refusing to consider changing the requirement to airbags 
only. BRW makes a fairly persuasive -- and, importantly, fairly 
narrow -- argument that because the airbag feature already was in 
the rule, the agency at least should have explained why it threw 
that feature out as well. 
(ii) failing to explain why a continuous spool belt -- which 
is not detachable, but which can be "spooled 11C but in cases of 
emergency -- was not an acceptable alternative to detachable 
belts. Such a spool belt exists and the agency has held that it 
2. 
complies with the standard. For this reason, BRW makes a good 
argument that the agency should have stated why such a belt would 
not resolve the problems with detachable belts. 
(iii) failing to explain why seat belt usage will not in- ) 
crease with detachable belts. Here I strongly disagree with BRW. \ 
/ I think the agency made a rational judgment that a detachable 
: passive restraint may not be used that much more often than a 
I 
/I 
regular seat belt. Little evidence was offered, but then little 
exists. 
-----I think this holding on the part of BRW is dangerous. The 
first two of BRW's holdings are narrow, because they tell the 
agency only that there were issues that should not have been ig-
nored completely. The third holding, in contrast, tells the 
agency that its explanation was not good enough -- even though 
the agency said more on the subject than had been said when the 
detachable belt was approved in the first place. 
At this point, I would recommend that you join an opinion 
that upheld the agency's finding that detachable belts would not 
produce sufficient benefits but that remanded for an explanation 
on airbags and continuous spool belts. This differs from your 
original vote to reverse. The reason I would join BRW on the 
airbags and spool belt issues is that these were not mere hypo-
thetical alternatives. Rather, they were features of the origi-
nal rule. It seems fair to ask the agency to explain why it 




' bel ts -- that it found troublesome, rather than elimi-
nating the entire rule. It may well be that the agency has an 
3. 
explanation; some arguments were advanced in the briefs. But BRW 
is correct that the agency utterly failed to address these in its 
original decision. 
At this point, BRW may still be receptive to a suggested 
change along these lines. There were not five votes for the 
views of this opinion. (TM originally was the only vote to af-
firm. The fact that he joined within hours -- along with JPS 
is evidence of the breadth of this opinion.) But as of now, it 
is unclear whether HAB or SOC will join BRW; I think they are 
more concerned about the airbag issue. If you were willing to go 
along, this would assure BRW of a Court (for TM, JPS, and/or WJB 
necessarily would join the airbags discussion). This is an in-
stance in which I think this movement on your part could result 
in preventing a substantially worse outcome. 
CHAMBERS OF 
-
.:§upunu QJirurl irf tlrt ~Wt .;§ntlt.6' 
'JJ In¥ l?fu:gtcn. ~. QJ. 20 ffe,ll., 
-
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
June 6, 1983 
Re: 82-354; 82-355; 82-398 - Motor Vehicle 
Manufacturers Assn. v. State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., et al. 
Dear Byron: 




Copies to the Conference 
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- · June. 6, 1983 
Re: No. 82-354,355 and 398-Motor Vehicle 
Manufacturers Association of the US 
v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins; 
Consumer Alert v. State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Ins. and United States 
Dept. of Transportation v. State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Ins. 
Dear Byron: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
-;;1/u • --. 
T.M. 
Justice White 
cc: The Conference 
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JUSTICE SANDR A DAY O'CONNO R 
June 6, 1983 
No. 82-354 Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Assoc. 




Consumer Alert v. State Fa rm 
U. S. Dept. of Trans portation v. 
State Farm 
For the present, I will await any further 
writing in this case. · 
Sincerely, 
Justice White 
Copies to the Conference 
